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Viger: Professional Gamers

PROFESSIONAL GAMERS ARE TODAY’S
PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES
Troy Viger
ABSTRACT
Recall the adversities faced by many in the entertainment industry.
Freddie Mercury tried to join several bands before forming Queen.
Judy Garland signed with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer at age thirteen
after performing with her sisters throughout her childhood. Babe
Ruth signed his first professional baseball contract with the
minor-league Baltimore Orioles. Those same historic adversities
faced by these giants of the entertainment industry are being
repeated today in a closely related field—the Esports industry.
Esports, a form of competitive video gaming, attracts audiences
that “rival some of the world’s great sporting events.” A thorough
due diligence review of the industry-norm contract must be
undertaken. Esports professionals continue to fall victim to
handshake deals put to paper like so many entertainers before them.
Esports organizations use heavy-handed contracts to severely limit
professionals from exploring other options and strip them of most of
their earnings.
Turner “Tfue” Tenney’s lawsuit against FaZe Clan brought to the
forefront the lack of regulation in the Esports industry and the
question of whether gamers should be entitled to similar protections
as actors, artists, and athletes, and other entertainers. The Talent
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Agency Act (TAA) and the Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act (MAA)
apply different standards to the representation of artists and athletes.
By dismantling the pros from the cons of these two Acts, legislatures
can craft new Esports-specific legislation to protect the creative
minds of these professionals.
Specifically, the proposed legislation should further define
“artist” and “other entertainment enterprises” from the TAA to
account for the new characters in the entertainment industry, such as
professional gamers and influencers. The legislation should also
define “athlete” to help guide courts in determining if professional
gamers are better labeled as an athlete, artist, or a combination of
the two.
This is not the first time the entertainment industry has prioritized
agents’ financial gains over artists’ and athletes’ freedom to contract
and livelihoods, but hopefully courts, legislatures, and lawyers can
use the past lessons of Freddie, Judy, Babe, and the countless others
to better protect professional gamers.
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INTRODUCTION
Esports, a form of competitive video gaming, is a worldwide
phenomenon projected to eclipse $1.8 billion in global revenue by
2022.1 The immediate and continuing societal impact of video games
cannot be overstated, but few remember the first Esports event in
1972.2 That event featured the video game Spacewar! and offered
only a year’s subscription to Rolling Stone as the meager grand
prize.3 Nearly half a century later, the sixteen-year-old Kyle
Giersdorf won $3 million in the first-ever Fortnite World Cup.4
Giersdorf’s winnings greatly exceeded that of the victors of the
Masters, the PGA Championship, and nearly matched the U.S. Open
earnings.5 His win propelled the world of competitive video gaming
into a fast-growing, international spectacle with millions of fans and
billions of dollars up for grabs.6 Giersdorf and other Esports
1. Guide:
What
Are
E-Sports?,
BBC,
https://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/37773832
[https://perma.cc/J4ET-U57Y] (Apr. 6, 2017, 2:50 PM) (“Some players might train for up to 14 hours a
day to make sure they have extremely quick reflexes and reactions. Players might make more than 300
‘actions’ per minute, so they have to be able to multi-task extremely well.”); see also Jurre Pannekeet,
Global Esports Economy Will Top $1 Billion for the First Time in 2019, NEWZOO (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://newzoo.com/insights/articles/newzoo-global-esports-economy-will-top-1-billion-for-the-firsttime-in-2019/ [https://perma.cc/Z6CQ-Y6P7].
2. The History and Evolution of Esports, BOUNTIE GAMING (Jan. 3, 2018),
https://bountiegaming.medium.com/the-history-and-evolution-of-esports-8ab6c1cf3257
[https://perma.cc/834P-5E83].
3. Id. (“[I]t wasn’t until 1980 whereby the first video game competition was held. The Space
Invaders Championship had a great attendance of 10,000 participants and received widespread media
attention since Space Invaders . . . was a household name at that point of time.”).
4. Patrick Smith, E-Sports Practices Get Boost with Teen’s Fortnite Win, LAW.COM: THE AM.
LAW. (Aug. 5, 2019, 10:16 AM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2019/08/05/e-sports-practicesget-boost-with-teens-fortnite-win/ [https://perma.cc/T7QB-W87S].
5. Id.; Masters 2019: How Much the Winner of the Masters Makes, PGA (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://www.pga.com/events/masters/masters-2019-how-much-winner-masters-makes
[https://perma.cc/H3JF-2QXJ]; James Crabtree-Hannigan, U.S. Open Prize Money: How Much Will the
Winners Make in 2019? Purse, Breakdown for Field, SPORTING N EWS (Sept. 7, 2019),
https://www.sportingnews.com/us/tennis/news/us-open-prize-money-2019-pursebreakdown/eao43nwd2l551a3j5yzvdnfeq [https://perma.cc/UJ9L-LH6B]; 2019 PGA Championship:
Purse and Winner’s Share, PGA (May 19, 2019), https://www.pga.com/events/pgachampionship/2019pga-championship-purse-and-winners-share/ [https://perma.cc/68MZ-67R4].
6. AJ Willingham, What Is Esports? A Look at an Explosive Billion-Dollar Industry, CNN (Aug.
27, 2018, 2:18 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/27/us/esports-what-is-video-game-professionalleague-madden-trnd/ [https://perma.cc/D64Q-2T6Z] (“Streaming services and live events have turned
casual gamers into serious stars who can sometimes rake in seven-figure earnings and massive brand
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participants are far from the “perpetuated stereotype of video games
being played by overweight teenagers huddled in dark basements”—
evident by the 380 million-person global Esports audience in 2018,
165 million of whom were dedicated viewers.7
Nothing less than a modern gold rush, Esports’ success has led
many to mention it alongside other more traditional sports like
baseball, but “the comparison may not be apt.”8 The term Esports
“has been assigned to the practice,” but whether lawmakers and
regulators agree that the contests are indeed sports remains to be
seen.9 “Often referred to as the ‘wild wild west,’ esports law is a
rowdy, unrestrained, and often lawless legal landscape”10 that is
“rapidly gaining mainstream attention.”11
When approaching Esports, legislators and courts must be careful
not to hinder its growth but rather take into account the unique nature
of the industry and help Esports professionals continue to climb the
ladder of global success.12 Video game jurisprudence will likely grow
quickly as courts face tough decisions—such as determining whether
“esports [are] ‘sports’ in the traditional athletic sense.”13 And one
new lawsuit started challenging courts to answer the debate of

endorsements.”).
7. John T. Holden et al., The Future Is Now: Esports Policy Considerations and Potential
Litigation, 27 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 46, 47 (2017); Pannekeet, supra note 1.
8. John T. Holden & Thomas A. Baker III, The Econtractor? Defining the Esports Employment
Relationship, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 391, 391 (2019).
9. Holden et al., supra note 7 (“[R]egulators . . . and . . . courts need to address the normative
question most competitive activities deal with at their nascent stage: Are esports ‘sports’ in the
traditional athletic sense? Or are video game competitions more closely aligned with professional
wrestling and other types of performing arts and/or skill-based entertainment?” (footnotes omitted)).
10. Ellen M. Zavian & Jim Schmitz, Genesis of an Industry: The Emerging Workforce and
Regulations of Esports, 37 ACC DOCKET 24, 26 (2019) (stating that the audience has surpassed
spectator numbers for traditional sports, like the National Football League’s 22.2 million live viewers
versus Esports’ 143 million).
11. Holden et al., supra note 7, at 46.
12. Though the Esports industry is growing exponentially, it is still in a very vulnerable position.
Just a single misguided law or misinformed judicial opinion could topple a movement that represents a
source of employment for many professionals, and a form of entertainment for many more across the
world.
13. Holden et al., supra note 7; Zavian & Schmitz, supra note 10 (“[Video games] differ from
traditional sports because the game publishers own their intellectual property. . . . [I]n esports,
publishers definitely own their games and thus are in complete control of the emerging industry . . . .”).
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“whether professional gamers are athletes, performers or something
else” where video games, players, and money converge in a new
market.14
This Note explores the classification of professional gamers and
the legal implications that result from that classification. Part I
discusses the background surrounding Esports and introduces the
debate of whether professional gamers are athletes, artists, or perhaps
both. Part II provides an analysis of how governing agencies have
applied laws differently to athletes and artists, the results of that
bifurcated application, and how agencies have applied similar laws to
athletes in traditional sports. Part III proposes a solution to the debate
over the legal classification of professional gamers, modeled from the
approach applied to traditional athletes but with a twist to account for
the unique landscape of those working in professional gaming, which
is a “predatory and largely unregulated industry that systematically
exploits its talent.”15
I. BACKGROUND
Regardless of whether society views Esports as a hobby, an
expensive waste of time, or an actual sport, the industry is growing
exponentially.16 Notwithstanding any negative attitude toward video
games, “esports will continue to grow as an industry—and a
pastime—for the foreseeable future” due to its seemingly
unstoppable cultural momentum. 17 Young people are participating

14. Jessica Conditt, Tfue’s Lawsuit Against FaZe Has Been a Long Time Coming, ENGADGET (May
21, 2019), https://www.engadget.com/2019/05/21/tfue-sue-faze-esports-contracts-agent-youtube-twitchinfluencer [https://perma.cc/ZNJ9-8FGU]; Zavian & Schmitz, supra note 10, at 27 (“Players are as
young as 15 years old when they enter into their first contract.”).
15. Hailey Konnath, Pro Gamer Slams ‘Unregulated,’ ‘Oppressive’ Esports Industry, LAW360 (May
20, 2019, 10:28 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1161538/pro-gamer-slams-unregulatedoppressive-esports-industry [https://perma.cc/3SYM-CEPH].
16. Zavian & Schmitz, supra note 10.
17. Willingham, supra note 6 (“Colleges have even gotten in on the action. More than 50 colleges
have varsity eSports programs, recognized by a governing body called the National Association of
Collegiate Esports [(NACE)]. NACE championships dole out thousands of dollars in prize money,
which is put towards scholarships for the winners.”).
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progressively more in high school and in collegiate Esports; in fact,
the industry is affording a select few the option to pursue a career in
not just a single genre but a single video game itself. 18 One of the
most popular Esports games, Overwatch, is described as “an
intense . . . action game that emphasizes teamwork and individual
skill. Players choose heroes with diverse and powerful abilities, then
clash on a variety of maps.”19 Another popular game is League of
Legends, which is a strategy role-playing game where “[t]wo teams
of five ‘champions’ compete to take down the other team’s base.”20
Overwatch and League of Legends are a part of one of the
“quickest-growing segments of the entertainment industry”:
competitive video gaming.21
18. William Stark et al., Antitrust Issues Grow Out of Esports’ Success, L.J. NEWSLS. (June 2019),
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/2019/06/01/antitrust-issues-grow-out-of-esportssuccess/?slreturn=20190828144655/ (explaining that the intellectual property rights game developers
possess pose interesting antitrust and fair use issues that this Note will not explore).
19. Steve Lubetkin, Online Computer Gaming Gains Validation with $50M Esports Arena in
Philadelphia
Sports
Complex,
GLOBEST.COM
(Mar.
26,
2019,
4:00
AM),
https://www.globest.com/2019/03/26/online-computer-gaming-gains-validation-with-50m-esportsarena-in-philadelphia-sports-complex/?slreturn=20190828145528/
[https://perma.cc/UWZ5-KPR6];
Overwatch, BLIZZARD ENT., https://playoverwatch.com/en-us/ [https://perma.cc/QJ9Q-BYSM]. A $50
million next-generation Esports and entertainment venue will be built in the Philadelphia Sports
Complex. Lubetkin, supra. This arena will be the largest of its kind in the Western Hemisphere
specifically built for the Esports industry and will accommodate 3,500 guests. Id. Setting the gold
standard for Esports, this project propels the industry into an equally exciting light as major traditional
sports. Id.
20. LEAGUE OF LEGENDS, https://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/ [https://perma.cc/UUH3-HG8E]; Mike
Snider, After a Decade, ‘League of Legends’ Remains at the Top of Its Game, USA TODAY: VIDEO
GAMES, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/gaming/2019/10/15/online-video-game-league-legendsturns-10-looks-future/3930899002/ [https://perma.cc/399K-5D8T] (Oct. 17, 2019, 10:35 AM) (“It is
probably the closest thing to taking chess out of the physical environment with all these additional layers
of critical thinking on top of it . . . .” (quoting Ann Hand, CEO and Chairman of Super League Gaming,
a national amateur Esports organization)).
21. Holden et al., supra note 7, at 46 (“Esports, as the practice of competitive video gaming has been
named, is a term that represents a variety of different game types and game titles.”); Katherine E.
Hollist, Note, Time To Be Grown-Ups About Video Gaming: The Rising eSports Industry and the Need
for Regulation, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 823, 825–26 (2015). Katherine Hollist provides the following
description of Esports:
Put simply, “eSports” are professional video game matches where players compete
against other players before an audience. In the past few years, eSports have emerged
as an increasingly popular alternative to other spectator sports, particularly among
younger viewers. Like their traditional sports counterparts, eSports players compete
in events with a variety of styles—some compete directly against other competitors in
one-on-one events (like tennis); others play in team events where teammates assume
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A. Investing in an Esports World
“Professional teams and players have fueled much of esports’
explosive growth, supported by significant investments from
traditional sports franchise owners . . . and increased visibility on
traditional media outlets.”22 Scrambling to compete for the valuable
youthful attention evidenced by rapidly rising viewership numbers,
major professional sports leagues have poured a “significant influx of
investment capital” into the explosive growth and commercial
opportunity in Esports.23
Cavs Legion, an Esports team affiliated with the Cleveland
Cavaliers of the National Basketball Association (NBA), announced
a plan to open “a new facility in Cleveland that will cater to players
and fans of the fast-growing esports industry.”24 Following suit,
different roles and work cooperatively to score points against other teams (like
basketball); and still others compete by allowing each competitor to take a turn and
then compare their ultimate times/scores (like Olympic skiing or gymnastics).
Today’s most popular eSports events center on team-based play. In League of
Legends, for instance, competitors face off as two teams of five. From their seats on
stage-left or stage-right in sold-out arenas, each player selects from an
ever-expanding set of in-game avatars, each equipped with five unique in-game
abilities. Ten player-controlled avatars materialize in the virtual League of Legends
arena, where they will skirmish one another, kill nonplayer minions for in-game gold
(which they can exchange for virtual items to increase their avatar’s power), and
ultimately fight to eliminate the opposing team by storming their opponent’s base.
The game operates like a combination of capture the flag and chess, with the
additional spectator appeal of the lightning-fast reflexes required to anticipate and
avoid the maneuvers of the human-controlled enemy players. Teams face off in
weekly match-ups during the regular season, and the teams with the best records
continue on to the championship rounds, where they can compete for enormous
prizes.
Hollist, supra (footnotes omitted).
22. P. William Stark & Steve Walkowiak, Growing Esports to a $1.6B Industry and Corruption
Risks,
LAW.COM:
TEX.
LAW.
(Jan.
25,
2019,
12:31
PM),
https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/2019/01/25/growing-esports-to-a-1-6b-industry-and-corruption-risks/
[https://perma.cc/4UNY-RFMG].
23. LONN A. TROST ET AL., 5 SUCCESSFUL PARTNERING BETWEEN INSIDE AND OUTSIDE
COUNSEL § 74A:71.50, Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2020); Zavian & Schmitz, supra note 10.
24. Matthew Guarnaccia, NBA’s Cavs Roll Out Plans for Esports Facility in Cleveland, LAW360
(July 19, 2019, 4:31 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1180211/nba-s-cavs-roll-out-plans-foresports-facility-in-cleveland [https://perma.cc/7YE3-QB6M] (“[The facility] will house a central stage
with two stacked rows of computers on each side. Each bank of six computers will face one another,
providing enough room for 12 competitors at a time, and will sit directly below a video display
stretching 5 feet high and 16 feet wide.”).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss3/8

8

Viger: Professional Gamers

2021]

PROFESSIONAL GAMERS

1009

game publishers such as Activision, Blizzard, and Riot Games, which
produce game titles such as League of Legends, Call of Duty,
Overwatch, and Halo have poured in investments. 25 Also joining the
fray are venture capital firms and sports celebrities. 26 Dallas
Cowboys owner, Jerry Jones, bought Complexity Gaming, a team
that will now play in Dallas, home of Esports Stadium Arlington. 27
And Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban owns Mavs Gaming,
which sponsors a team playing in the NBA 2K League.28 Perhaps
most prominently, actor Will Smith is among the new investors in the
Esports franchise Generation Gaming, which accounted for a new
$46 million round of financing.29
B. Esports Compared to Its Traditional Counterpart
To many, the idea that video game players have comparable skills
to the highest caliber of traditional professional athletes may be
laughable, but a growing number of people realize the unique talent,
skill, and dedication of professional gamers necessary to rise above a
saturated market and make a name in Esports.30 Major Esports events
attract audiences that “rival some of the world’s great sporting

25. Zavian & Schmitz, supra note 10; Trent Murray, Newzoo Report Projects Global Esports
Revenue
to
Reach
$1.1B
in
2019,
ESPORTS
OBSERVER
(Feb.
12,
2019),
https://esportsobserver.com/newzoo-2019-report/ [https://perma.cc/85H7-BVUG].
26. Zavian & Schmitz, supra note 10, at 25.
27. Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Munck Wilson Mandala Boosts Esports Expertise in Dallas, LAW.COM:
TEX. LAW. (May 17, 2019, 9:34 AM), https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/2019/05/17/munck-wilsonmandala-boosts-esports-expertise-in-dallas/ [https://perma.cc/52QA-MEKH].
28. Id. (“Technology-focused law firm Munck Wilson Mandala has hired video gaming trademark
lawyer D. Wade Cloud Jr. . . . . Munck Wilson isn’t the only firm in Texas beefing up its video gaming
expertise. Late last year, Greenberg Traurig . . . launched a multi-office, cross-practice team to do work
for esports clients . . . .”).
29. Eben Novy-Williams, Will Smith Takes Slice of Esports Team’s US$46 Million Financing, BNN
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/will-smith-takes-slice-of-esports-team-s46-million-financing-1.1245904 [https://perma.cc/DUP5-A36V] (“The coming years are going [to] see
our company really start to crystallize its identity, not just as a brand, but also as an enterprise . . . .”).
30. Paul Tassi, The U.S. Now Recognizes eSports Players As Professional Athletes, FORBES (July 14,
2013, 11:27 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2013/07/14/the-u-s-now-recognizes-esportsplayers-as-professional-athletes/#3e1d81333ac9 [https://perma.cc/U3SB-6HUJ] (“I do believe the scene
will continue to grow the way it has the past few years, and though it may never catch traditional sports,
it’s going to be a much more accepted and less niche past time in the future.”).
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events.”31 In many ways, “the eSports industry is similar to the
traditional sports from which it derives its name: it is an
entertainment industry built around competition, fan loyalty, and
spectatorship.”32 Unlike traditional professional athletes, Esports
gamers are not backed by unions or players associations, making
Esports dramatically different from those traditional sports—and
giving rise to important legal questions. 33 Two California laws could
decide an Esports gamer’s lawsuit against their employing company:
the Miller-Ayala Athlete Agency Act (MAA)34 and the Talent
Agencies Act (TAA).35 These two laws have the potential to reshape
contracts in the Esports industry and tame the meteoric growth of
Esports.36
Under the TAA, any business or individual who acts like an agent
must do so with an agent or agency license obtained through
California’s Labor Commission.37 In debate, Esports lawyers always
31. TROST ET AL., supra note 23 (“Although still in a growth stage, the eSports industry has millions
of international fans, dedicated arenas and facilities, sophisticated leagues, lucrative media rights
agreements and other elements of traditional sports leagues.”).
32. Hollist, supra note 21, at 826. The combination of video game matchups, commentators,
merchandise, and ticket venue sales make up the Esports industry. Id.
33. Duran Parsi, All in the Game, 42 L.A. LAW. 26, 27 (2019); Zachary Zagger, Fortnite Gamer’s
Suit Puts Pressure on Esports Contracts, LAW360 (May 29, 2019, 10:12 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1162206/fortnite-gamer-s-suit-puts-pressure-on-esports-contracts
[https://perma.cc/LCC9-4WXC] (noting that one legal issue asks “the question of whether gamers
should be entitled to the same agent protections as actors and artists in the traditional entertainment
industry”).
34. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18895 (West 2017).
35. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700 (West 2013).
36. Turner “Tfue” Tenney’s lawsuit is “spurring conversations across influencer and esports spaces
alike,” and if he prevails, the lawsuit will set “new, overdue standards for the esports industry overall.”
Conditt, supra note 14; see also Konnath, supra note 15. Additionally, other players’ contracts with
gaming companies could be called into question, potentially “shift[ing] the balance of power to the
gamers . . . who are actually . . . driving the industry.” Complaint at 4, Tenney v. FaZe Clan Inc., No.
19STCV17341 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 20, 2019), 2019 WL 2195136; see also Michael McCann, Inside
the Lawsuit That Could Shake Up the Entire Esports Industry, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 30, 2019),
https://www.si.com/more-sports/2019/05/30/turner-tenney-faze-clan-esports-lawsuit-fortnite
[https://perma.cc/P594-8NDF]. A Tfue victory “would be a very significant piece of precedent because
it would take a lot of existing regulations that have not applied to esports” and finally apply them to the
industry. Zagger, supra note 33 (“Morrison said he expects to see ‘near instant changes to contracts’ and
expects teams to start to preemptively renegotiate deals with their top gamers.” (quoting Esports
attorney Ryan Morrison)).
37. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.5 (West 2013) (“No person shall engage in or carry on the occupation of
a talent agency without first procuring a license therefor from the Labor Commissioner. The license
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highlight that teams currently in the Esports industry actually have a
license, which is required to negotiate or bring deals to the players. 38
Further, once the agent obtains a license, they must abide by the
regulations set forth in the statute, “which include submitting form
contracts and fees to the state, posting bond, and prohibitions against
discrimination and certain types of conflicts of interest.”39 Since the
TAA’s enactment in 1978, many lawsuits have challenged its
loopholes and flaws that undermine the California legislature’s intent
in passing the Act: to prevent agents from taking advantage of
artists.40
The MAA bans sports teams from acting as representatives for
their players and puts in place a registration system with an enhanced
system of civil and criminal liability. 41 Before acting as an athlete’s
agent in California, any person, even a licensed California attorney,
must register with the secretary of state and provide all information

shall be posted in a conspicuous place in the office of the licensee. The license number shall be referred
to in any advertisement for the purpose of the solicitation of talent for the talent agency. Licenses issued
for talent agencies prior to the effective date of this chapter shall not be invalidated thereby, but
renewals of those licenses shall be obtained in the manner prescribed by this chapter.”); McCann, supra
note 36.
38. Thooorin, Esports Salon Episode 19: A Few Good Contracts (Feat. Ryan Morrison, Bryce Blum
& Richard Lewis), YOUTUBE (June 30, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8vTgtDpcj04.
39. Myles L. Gutenkunst, Talent Managers Acting As Agents Revisited: An Argument for
California’s Imperfect Talent Agencies Act, 37 HASTINGS COMMC’NS & ENT. L.J. 113, 119 (2015); CAL.
LAB. CODE § 1700.23 (West 2013) (“Every talent agency shall submit to the Labor Commissioner a
form or forms of contract to be utilized by such talent agency in entering into written contracts with
artists for the employment of the services of such talent agency by such artists, and secure the approval
of the Labor Commissioner thereof. Such approval shall not be withheld as to any proposed form of
contract unless such proposed form of contract is unfair, unjust and oppressive to the artist. . . . There
shall be printed on the face of the contract in prominent type the following: ‘This talent agency is
licensed by the Labor Commissioner of the State of California.’” (emphasis added)); CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1700.24 (West 2013) (“Every talent agency shall file with the Labor Commissioner a schedule of fees
to be charged and collected in the conduct of that occupation . . . .”).
40. See Gutenkunst, supra note 39, at 122 n.72 (discussing how clashes between talent managers and
artists form when the manager procures employment and how the artist holds out on commission
because the manager is not a licensed agent).
41. See Chiapparelli v. Henderson, No. F046363, 2005 WL 1847221, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 5,
2005) (deeming a contract between a mixed martial artist and his agent void because of a failure to
follow the requirements of the MAA); Robert P. Baker, The Unintended Consequence of the
Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act: Depriving Student Athletes of Effective Legal Representation, 12
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 267, 270 (2005); Conditt, supra note 14.
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required under the MAA.42 The MAA provides athletes with a
remedy by deeming noncompliant contracts “void and
unenforceable.”43 Overall, the MAA’s main purpose “is to ensure
that agents act in the best interests of their principals, and not for
their own personal gain.”44
C. Turner “Tfue” Tenney’s Gamer Agreement
Given the rate at which Esports audiences and businesses are
expanding, many of the contracts in place originally grew out of an
underground gaming culture; now there is a present need for
thorough due diligence review of gamer contracts.45 For many,
becoming an Esports pro “marks their first ‘real’ job with a salary
and benefits, meaning they frequently lack experience to adequately
understand their rights and advocate for themselves.”46 These
42. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18896 (West 2017); Baker, supra note 41, at 273.
43. Joel M. Smith, Increasing Penalties to Catch California’s First Unscrupulous Athlete Agent, 43
MCGEORGE L. REV. 538, 543 (2012). The MAA provides for various penalties for different violations:
Failure to follow the Miller-Ayala Act can result in civil and criminal penalties. The
Miller-Ayala Act allows for any person, educational institution, or league to bring a
civil action if they are “adversely affected” by the acts of an athlete agent. Plaintiffs
are allowed to recover the greater of fifty-thousand dollars or actual damages,
including punitive damages, court costs, and attorney fees. Any contract that does not
comply with the Miller-Ayala Act is “void and unenforceable.” Although the
legislature intended civil enforcement, a violation of the Miller-Ayala Act is a
misdemeanor and punishable by a fine of no more than fifty-thousand dollars,
imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. Also, “the court may suspend or
revoke” an athlete agent’s privilege of being an athlete agent in California. Finally,
the statute of limitations for a violation of the Miller-Ayala Act was one year after
commission of the violation.
Id. at 543–44 (footnotes omitted) (quoting CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18897.63 (West 2017)).
44. Marc Edelman, Disarming the Trojan Horse of the UAAA and Sparta: How America Should
Reform Its Sports Agent Laws to Conform with True Agency Principles, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L.
145, 147 (2013).
45. TROST ET AL., supra note 23; see also Mike Ozanian et al., The World’s Most Valuable Esports
Companies,
FORBES
(Oct.
23,
2018,
5:50
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2018/10/23/the-worlds-most-valuable-esports-companies1/#7f1fbdb16a6e [https://perma.cc/3TCW-XLCA]; Zavian & Schmitz, supra note 10, at 29 (“As of
2018, the top 12 esports companies fielded a total of 588 players on 97 teams.”).
46. Uriah Tagle, As North American Esports Levels Up, Its Players Lag Behind, 19 TEX. REV. ENT.
& SPORTS L. 81, 82 (2019); Zavian & Schmitz, supra note 10, at 26–28 (explaining that professional
gamers in the early days were deemed “independent contractors” because earnings solely came from
prize money, but now gamer agreements involve a “level of control typically wielded by an employer”
making gamers “wear certain brands or logos . . . , stream their play on specific platforms, reside in
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“contracts have routinely favored organizations’ financial progress
over players’ best interests.”47 This continues to exploit and force
Esports professionals to work for low salaries on unfavorable terms. 48
Stated more bluntly, Esports players do not realize the rights they are
contractually giving away.49
Among the Esports professionals that are too “young,
inexperienced with the workforce, and seemingly too busy to stop
and consider if their job conditions seem fair,” Turner “Tfue” Tenney
also fell victim to a “handshake deal, put to paper.”50 Tfue is a
“social media celebrity and professional player of the video game
Fortnite.”51 Tfue, in 2019, was one of the most popular players in the
world of Fortnite—a multiplayer phenomenon known as “an
open-world survival game, in which players collect resources, make
tools and weapons, and try to stay alive as long as possible.”52 Tfue’s
lawsuit alleged that FaZe Clan (FaZe), the Esports organization he
signed with, violated California labor laws.53 FaZe is an “esports and
specific locations, . . . and, more crucially, require that the player provide services exclusively to that
company”).
47. Conditt, supra note 14; see also Tim Rizzo & Nick Geracie, Evolved Talent CEO Ryan Morrison
Breaks Down Tfue’s Lawsuit Against FaZe Clan, INVEN GLOBAL (May 20, 2019),
https://www.invenglobal.com/articles/8253/evolved-talent-ceo-ryan-morrison-breaks-down-tfueslawsuit-against-faze-clan [https://perma.cc/85WR-MSLR] (“When a non-esports attorney comes in and
reviews an esports contract, what they usually comment is along the lines, ‘This is breaking the law in
19 different ways. None of this is okay.’”).
48. Tagle, supra note 46, at 81 (“An attorney who represents professionals further described them as
‘socially awkward,’ and ‘uncomfortable to ask for things.’ . . . Without the protections of labor
organizations like those available to young professionals in traditional sports leagues, esports
professionals often unknowingly sign contracts that deprive them of their rights.”).
49. McCann, supra note 36 (“There are also larger themes at stake. A key one is the notion that
esports players are inadequately informed about the contracts they sign. A relatively
straightforward . . . remedy to that concern would be for players to hire attorneys, particularly those with
esports expertise.”).
50. Tagle, supra note 46; TROST ET AL., supra note 23. See generally Conditt, supra note 14.
51. FaZe Clan Inc. v. Tenney, 467 F. Supp. 3d 180, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (emphasis added).
52. Sarah LeBoeuf, What is ‘Fortnite’?: A Look at the Video Game That Has Become a
Phenomenon, NBC NEWS, https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/what-fortnite-look-video-gamehas-become-phenomenon-n887706 [https://perma.cc/EVF6-BYB5] (June 30, 2018, 11:27 AM); Conditt,
supra note 14.
53. Conditt, supra note 14 (explaining that the TAA is designed to protect entertainers in California
from raw representation deals and that the MAA is more restrictive than the TAA because the MAA
bans sports teams from acting as representatives for their players). Rohan Nadkarni, The Stream Team,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 10, 2021), https://www.si.com/tech-media/2021/06/10/daily-cover-faze-
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entertainment organization that competes in video game tournaments
and creates social media content.”54 His important lawsuit raises the
question of “whether gamers should be entitled to the same agent
protections as actors and artists in the traditional entertainment
industry,” or rather as professional athletes. 55
Under the “nebulous nature of esports,” Tfue’s lawyers presented
their client as an “artist,” which shined the light on gamers as
“professional competitors and online entertainers in equal
measure.”56 Professional gamers’ work is “arguably akin to
performing art and athletic performance,” but some debate the
connection between Esports and athletics.57 For its part, the
International Olympic Committee, in considering whether to add
Esports to the Olympic Games, reviewed the definition of
“athleticism,” which includes “the kinds of hand-eye skills and other
traits essential to esports.”58

clan-kyler-murray-bronny-james [https://perma.cc/W3C2-74YN] (“Trink is the CEO of FaZe Clan, a
gaming collective born in 2010 as a YouTube channel for creative ‘killshots’ performed in the video
game Call of Duty. Now, depending on which side of the millennial–Gen Z line you sit, FaZe has grown
into either a confusing digital behemoth that serves as a stark reminder of how the world has passed you
by, or a cultural (and merchandising) force that bonds a disparate groups of gamers, athletes, musicians,
influencers and content creators into an amorphous digital squad that has become the internet’s version
of the cool kids’ table in your high school cafeteria.”).
54. FaZe Clan, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 183 (quoting Anderson Decl. ¶ 2, ECF No. 47-3).
55. Zagger, supra note 33; Conditt, supra note 14 (explaining that Tfue’s Twitter biography states
that he is a “professional athlete,” but his lawyer seems to paint him with a different description).
56. Conditt, supra note 14 (quoting Barry Lee, senior agent at Evolved Talent Agency) (“The
Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act is more for athletes, and if you look at how battle royale players have
been monetizing, they’re esports players, but the way they make the bulk of their money is as
influencers . . . . Legally, as a Fortnite streamer, Tfue is an entertainer first, not an athlete.” (quoting
Barry Lee, senior agent at Evolved Talent Agency)).
57. McCann, supra note 36 (“Tenney’s complaint stresses that esports players perform, act, direct
and edit their videos and then stream those videos to their millions of followers through YouTube and
Twitch. With numerous views of the videos, advertising dollars and sponsorship opportunities are
generated. . . . Tenney is the most watched Fortnite streamer on Twitch. Tenney’s complaint emphasizes
that ‘sponsors are willing to pay for Tenney to perform in and create videos that will, at least in part,
promote their goods, services and brands.’ Yet the deal he signed with FaZe Clan limits his capacity to
profit from his talents.” (emphasis added) (quoting Complaint, supra note 36, at 2)).
58. Id.; Paris 2024 Olympics: Esports ‘in Talks’ to Be Included As Demonstration Sport, BBC:
SPORT (Apr. 25, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/sport/olympics/43893891 [https://perma.cc/J2FC-9SBP]
(“[The International Olympic Committee] said it is open to exploring the possibility of including esports
in future Games, before stating at a November summit it ‘could be considered a sporting
activity’ . . . .”).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol37/iss3/8

14

Viger: Professional Gamers

2021]

PROFESSIONAL GAMERS

1015

Regardless of how Esports players are categorized, however,
Tfue’s lawsuit emphasized the state of Esports’ legal landscape.
Specifically, Tfue has “tor[n] into the manner” in which Esports
companies use “heavy-handed” gamer agreements to “own”
professional gamers in an industry “so new it lacks needed oversight
and talent protection.”59 Due to this lack of industry oversight and
scores of gamers unwilling or unable to stand up to it, Tfue argued
that FaZe “enjoyed the fruits of this illegal business model with
impunity”—but as the legal landscape around Esports evolves, “those
days are over.”60
II. ANALYSIS
For some, Tfue’s lawsuit is comparable to a “high school band
getting the[ir] first record deal” in that many Esports players eagerly
sign the first contract thrown at them. 61 Tfue’s attorneys painted the
contract (Gamer Agreement) as one of the worst in talent history, but
his employers begged to differ. 62 Tfue contended that FaZe was
59. Konnath, supra note 15 (“FaZe Clan exploits and takes advantage of young, ‘unsophisticated,
unseasoned and trusting’ gamers, saddling them with contracts that ‘severely limit’ them from exploring
deals with other companies and strip them of most of their earnings . . . .” (quoting Complaint, supra
note 36, at 2–3)).
60. Id. (stating that Tfue seeks injunctive relief against FaZe and that a win for Tfue would reshape
contracts in the Esports industry); Hailey Konnath, FaZe Clan Counterstrikes Esports Gamer with
$20M Suit, LAW360 (Aug. 1, 2019, 11:13 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1184611/faze-clancounterstrikes-esports-gamer-with-20m-suit (“This is the first time in the history of esports that an
organization has had the audacity to try and enforce contractual provisions that are so clearly illegal
against one [of] its gamers.” (alteration in original)). The conditions are quite worrisome:
Player conditions are particularly troubling when one recalls that many of these
professional players are minors. Although Riot has a self-imposed minimum age of
17 for its professional League of Legends players, other developers and leagues can—
and do—allow teams to contract with even younger teenagers. In traditional sports,
collectively bargained agreements handle questions of age minimums; in their
nascent stages, traditional American sports also accepted players of all ages. It took
decades of negotiation and litigation to reach the point where leagues included age
restrictions as part of a collectively bargained agreement.
Hollist, supra note 21, at 835 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
61. Thooorin, supra note 38.
62. ‘Fortnite’ Gamer Tfue’s Contract with FaZe Clan Finally Revealed!, THE BLAST [hereinafter
Tfue’s
Contract],
https://theblast.com/esports-gamer-tfue-faze-clan-contract-revealed/
[https://perma.cc/TX9C-7ETD] (June 11, 2019, 10:56 PM) (“This is the most unfair contract I have ever
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operating as a talent management firm while not licensed to do so
under California law and that several parts of the contract violated
laws dealing with anticompetition. 63
Tfue and FaZe’s “relationship does not seem much different from
a sports agency model for an athlete or an entertainment agency
representing talent,” but the lawsuit poses an important question as to
what law regulates representatives of Esports gamers.64 If Esports are
a “sport” and professional gamers are “athletes,” then the MAA
applies.65 If Esports are “media and entertainment,” then the TAA
applies.66 Esports could also be something entirely new—perhaps an
entity comprised of “influencers” that requires new regulations.67 The
need for new regulations is clear given state legislatures’
unintentional division of athletes in different statutes and the
presence of unartfully drafted, conflicting definitions of “athlete.”68
The industry is changing, and Tfue’s lawsuit finally brought to the
forefront the issue of the lack of regulation in the Esports industry

seen in almost 30 years of practicing law.” (quoting Bryan J. Freedman, attorney for Tfue)).
63. Id. (explaining that Tfue’s major concern is that the Gamer Agreement entitles FaZe to millions
if the agreement is extended for another three years).
64. Jeremy Evans, 5 Solutions to the Esports Industry Regulation Dilemma, SPORTS RADIO AM.:
SPORTS BUS. (July 7, 2019), https://sportsradioamerica.com/2019/07/07/5-solutions-to-the-esportsindustry-regulation-dilemma/ [https://perma.cc/J9YB-WCQK] (opening with the solution of creating a
professional gamer’s union, but then quickly dismantling the proposal because unions do not solve all
players’ concerns, specifically those of individual athletes because some professional video games are
single-player).
65. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18895 (West 2017); Evans, supra note 64 (stating that attorneys fall
in “legislative purgatory” because they will be required to get an agency license, file a disclosure
statement, and pay a small fee).
66. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700 (West 2013); Evans, supra note 64.
67. Evans, supra note 64 (explaining how the Esports industry is changing traditional entertainment
and media industries and proposing a new model in regulation in light of a newly crafted and unique
Esports industry).
68. Diane Sudia & Rob Remis, Athlete Agent Legislation in the New Millennium: State Statutes and
the Uniform Athlete Agents Act, 11 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 263, 277 (2001) (chastising the vagueness
and overbreadth of the statutes, paired with the numerous constitutional defects, which result in statutory
loopholes from unartfully drafted language); Rob Remis & Diane Sudia, Escaping Athlete Agent
Statutory Regulation: Loopholes and Constitutional Defectiveness Based on Tri-Parte Classification of
Athletes, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 1, 3–4 (1999) (harping on the fact that many athlete agent statutes
are so poorly drafted that some legislatures purposely limit the scope of the statute to avoid regulating
some types of athletes, and that other legislatures inadvertently use terminology that overreaches to
different types of athletes).
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and the confusing and outdated regulations applicable to a
predominantly older industry. 69
A. Talent Agency Act
Tfue’s lawyers portrayed Tfue as an artist, not an athlete, zealously
advocating that Tfue should be afforded the protection from “raw
representation deals” given by California’s TAA.70 Indeed, the
California Courts of Appeal has stated: the TAA “should be liberally
construed” to protect agents’ clients.71
Tfue claimed his agreement with FaZe violated the TAA by
procuring employment for Tfue without a license and allowed FaZe
to take “grossly high commissions.”72 In cases considered by the
California Labor Commission where the alleged agent did not have a
license, the vast majority of the corresponding agreements were
found to be void.73 In fact, the Waisbren v. Peppercorn Productions,
69. Evans, supra note 64. See generally Joost, Esports Governance and Its Failures, MEDIUM (Oct.
16,
2017),
https://medium.com/@heyimJoost/esports-governance-and-its-failures-9ac7b3ec37ea
[https://perma.cc/LYG4-RE75] (examining the lack of a unified source of governance in creating two
other significant issues: the absence of regulations for competitive integrity and the lack of policy
concerning a duty of care towards players).
70. Conditt, supra note 14 (highlighting that Tfue’s lawsuit is spurring conversation across
influencer and Esports spaces). But see Tfue (@TTfue), TWITTER (May 2014),
https://twitter.com/TTfue?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor
[https://perma.cc/PJR8-QUXT] (highlighting “Professional Athlete” in his biography).
71. Waisbren v. Peppercorn Prods., Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 441–42 (Ct. App. 1995) (“[T]he Act
should be liberally construed to promote the general object sought to be accomplished . . . . To ensure
the personal, professional, and financial welfare of artists, the Act strictly regulates a talent agent’s
conduct.” (footnotes omitted) (citing Henning v. Indus. Welfare Com., 46 Cal. 3d 1262, 1269 (1988));
David Zelenski, Talent Agents, Personal Managers, and Their Conflicts in the New Hollywood, 76 S.
CAL. L. REV. 979, 984–85 (2003). The TAA’s purpose is to protect artists from ill-willed
representatives, for example:
[I]t prohibits agents from giving their clients false or misleading information
concerning employment engagements; from sending them to unsafe places; from
allowing “prostitutes, gamblers, [or] intoxicated persons . . . [to] be employed
in . . . the place of business of the talent agency”; from arranging unlawful
employment for minors; and from splitting fees with the employers who hire their
clients.
Zelenski, supra (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.35 (West
2013)).
72. Zagger, supra note 33.
73. Determination of Controversy at 4, 8, Beaudoin v. Macalpin, No. TAC 48086 (Cal. Lab.
Comm’n Dec. 11, 2018) (finding invalid and unenforceable an agreement between a popular online
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Inc. decision stands for the bright-line rule that any unlicensed
activity is covered by the TAA.74 In Waisbren, a personal manager
brought an action against puppet creators for an alleged breach of an
agreement to pay him the right percentage of their profits.75 Citing
the California Entertainment Commission, the court highlighted the
simple approach to the regulation of agents and managers: “one
either is, or is not, licensed as a talent agent, and, if not so licensed,
one cannot expect to engage . . . in any activity relating to the
services which a talent agent is licensed to render.”76 The court held
that the personal manager who procured employment for the artist,
even as an incidental portion of his business, was subject to the
licensing requirements of the TAA and granted summary judgment
for the puppet creators.77 Looking through the lenses of the Waisbren
court, surely the absence of FaZe’s license cuts in favor of Tfue’s
claim.
If a client’s representative violates the TAA, the client can
complain to the Labor Commissioner, who has exclusive authority to
hear and resolve disputes unless arbitration is required.78 In the spirit
personality—and an aspiring television and motion picture actor—and the manager for failure to
procure a license); Determination of Controversy at 9, Goldsmith v. Klein, No. TAC 46430 (Cal. Lab.
Comm’n May 24, 2018) (finding invalid and unenforceable an oral contract between an actor
performing in television shows, commercials, and motion pictures and an unlicensed talent agent);
Determination of Controversy at 7, Johnson v. Healey, No. TAC 16243 (Cal. Lab. Comm’n Oct. 8,
2018) (finding invalid and unenforceable an endorsement contract between a world-renowned model
and an unlicensed talent agency and ordering the talent agency to disgorge amount due); Thooorin,
supra note 38.
74. 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444; Gutenkunst, supra note 39, at 120.
75. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437.
76. Id. at 444. The California legislature created the California Entertainment Commission in 1982
to study the laws of California, New York, and other key entertainment cities in relation to licensing of
agents of artists in the entertainment industry to recommend a model bill regarding licensing. Id. at 442–
43.
77. Id. at 437.
78. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(a) (West 2013) (“In cases of controversy arising under this chapter,
the parties involved shall refer the matters in dispute to the Labor Commissioner, who shall hear and
determine the same, subject to an appeal within 10 days after determination, to the superior court where
the same shall be heard de novo.”); Zelenski, supra note 71. See generally Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S.
346, 349–50 (2008) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts the TAA and reversing and
remanding the California Court of Appeal’s decision to deny arbitration and grant personnel in the
motion picture–television industries’ motion to stay action pending proceedings before Labor
Commissioner).
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of the policy behind the TAA, California law provides a remedy
where any “unlicensed person’s contract with an artist to provide the
services of a talent agent is illegal and void.”79 If viewed in this light
by a court, Tfue’s contract with FaZe could be declared illegal and
void. FaZe’s lawyers opposed Tfue’s claims, arguing alongside other
managers that the Labor Commissioner had wrongfully disgorged or
negotiated away payments to managers, which were estimated to cost
the profession more than half a billion dollars.80
Under the TAA, a talent agent or agency engages in procuring
employment for an artist.81 Additionally, the TAA defines “artist” as
follows:
[A]ctors and actresses rendering services on the legitimate
stage and in the production of motion pictures, radio artists,
musical artists, musical organizations, directors of
legitimate stage, motion picture and radio productions,
musical directors, writers, cinematographers, composers,
lyricists, arrangers, models, and other artists and persons
rendering professional services in motion picture,
theatrical, radio, television and other entertainment
79. Styne v. Stevens, 26 P.3d 343, 349 (Cal. 2001) (“The Act is remedial; its purpose is to protect
artists seeking professional employment from the abuses of talent agencies.” (first citing Waisbren, 48
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437; and then citing Buchwald v. Superior Ct., 62 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Ct. App. 1967)));
Buchwald, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 367 (holding that contracts of the members of a professional musical group
and an unlicensed talent manager were entitled to relief, and annulling orders of the superior court);
Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 437; Gutenkunst, supra note 39, at 118.
80. See generally Nat’l Conf. of Pers. Managers, Inc. v. Brown, 690 F. App’x 461, 461 (9th Cir.
2017) (granting a motion to dismiss by holding in part that the TAA did not violate due process or the
Commerce Clause and did not implicate the First Amendment); Showbiz Personal Managers Say Talent
Agencies
Act
Unconstitutional,
DEADLINE
(Nov.
13,
2012,
2:05
PM),
https://deadline.com/2012/11/showbiz-personal-managers-say-talent-agencies-act-unconstitutional371031/ [https://perma.cc/8SLW-MSKL].
81. CAL. LAB. CODE LAB. § 1700.4(a) (West 2013). The statute provides as follows:
“Talent agency” means a person or corporation who engages in the occupation of
procuring, offering, promising, or attempting to procure employment or engagements
for an artist or artists, except that the activities of procuring, offering, or promising to
procure recording contracts for an artist or artists shall not of itself subject a person or
corporation to regulation and licensing under this chapter. Talent agencies may, in
addition, counsel or direct artists in the development of their professional careers.
Id.; see also Zelenski, supra note 71, at 985.
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enterprises.”82
This catchall provision under the decades-old statute’s definition
of “artist” plays a key point in classifying Tfue as an artist or athlete,
thus determining the applicable law.
A string of California cases provides some insight into entities
violating the TAA and how courts have handled such violations. In
Marathon Entertainment, Inc. v. Blasi, Marathon sued Rosa Blasi for
breach of contract and sought recovery of unpaid commissions.83
Blasi argued that Marathon procured employment as an unregistered
talent agent in violation of the TAA. 84 The labor commissioner
concluded that “any person who procures employment—any
individual, any corporation, any manager—is a talent agency subject
to regulation” and that Marathon violated the TAA because it failed
to secure a license and thus “voided the parties’ contract ab initio and
barred Marathon from recovery.”85
In Parapluie, Inc. v. Mills, the plaintiff acted as the defendant’s
representative and secured her a number of opportunities, including
appearances on the Larry King Show and the Celebrity Apprentice, a
82. LAB. § 1700.4(b) (emphasis added).
83. 174 P.3d 741, 744 (Cal. 2008). The court characterized their relationship as follows:
In 1998, Marathon and Blasi entered into an oral contract for Marathon to serve as
Blasi’s personal manager. Marathon was to counsel Blasi and promote her career; in
exchange, Blasi was to pay Marathon 15 percent of her earnings from entertainment
employment obtained during the course of the contract. During the ensuing three
years, Blasi’s professional appearances included a role in a film, Noriega: God’s
Favorite (Industry Entertainment 2000), and a lead role as Dr. Luisa Delgado on the
television series Strong Medicine.
Id.
84. Id.; Determination of Controversy at 5, Blasi v. Marathon Ent., Inc., No. TAC 15-03 (Cal. Lab.
Comm’n Jan. 30, 2004) (arguing that a California corporation individually procured an audition,
appearances on talk shows, and acting roles for an actress).
85. Marathon Ent., 174 P.3d at 744, 747. The Labor Commissioner stated:
In sum, petitioners have proved that respondents procured or attempted to procure
work for petitioners through contacting casting directors, sending out demo tapes of
petitioner Blasi, submitting petitioner Blasi for certain roles as an actress, and
securing auditions in plays and appearances on talk shows. Respondents, however,
have not met their burden of proving that each one of these engagements was
requested by Bressler-Kelly and done in conjunction with Bressler-Kelly.
Consequently, respondents are in violation of the Act.
Determination of Controversy, supra note 84, at 7.
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deal with TrimSpa, deals with PSDI USA and Gemini Fragrances,
the chance to be a judge for the Miss USA pageant, and guest
appearances on the daytime drama Days of Our Lives.86 The
defendant argued that the plaintiff was not a licensed talent agent,
and the plaintiff conceded this point but defended on the grounds that
the defendant was not an artist.87 The court concluded that the
defendant was an artist under the broad language of the TAA,
specifically the clause covering “other entertainment enterprises.”88
Thus, the court found that the TAA did apply to the contract in
dispute and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment.89
Marathon and Mills provide a framework to guide a consideration
of the Gamer Agreement at the heart of Tfue’s relationship with
FaZe. The Gamer Agreement is similar to the endorsement contract
at issue in Marathon, and the broad interpretation of the definition of
“artist” in the statute would seem to include professional gamers
under the broad language of “other entertainment enterprises.”
Further, the consistent entertainment value and notoriety of Tfue’s
employment with FaZe rise at least to the artistic level of the variety
of entertainment “odd jobs” secured by the talent agency for the
defendant in Mills. FaZe’s lack of compliance in obtaining a license
would thus likely lead a court to “void[] the parties’ contract ab
initio.”90
86. No. CV 11-02548, 2012 WL 12887556, at *3, *14 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012).
87. Id. at *13 (“Plaintiff does not dispute that neither it nor Blanchard are licensed. It contends,
however, that Heather is not an ‘artist’ within the meaning of the TAA, and that the statute therefore
does not apply.” (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.5 (West 2013))).
88. Id. at *14 & n.78 (emphasis added) (“Heather testified that she did not consider herself an
‘actor,’ but a ‘TV presenter.’ . . . Her characterization of her work is not dispositive, however, and the
statute’s broad definition of artist appears to encompass a ‘TV presenter’ as well.” (emphasis added)
(citation omitted)).
89. Id. at *16.
90. Marathon Ent., 174 P.3d at 744. The following actions provide an example of a contract voided
ab initio:
After obtaining a stay of the action, Blasi filed a petition with the Labor
Commissioner alleging that Marathon had violated the Act by soliciting and
procuring employment for Blasi without a talent agency license. The Labor
Commissioner agreed. The Commissioner found Marathon had procured various
engagements for Blasi, including a role in the television series Strong Medicine.
Concluding that one or more acts of solicitation and procurement by Marathon
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B. Miller-Ayala Athlete Agents Act
Alternatively, Tfue’s lawyers could have chosen to present Tfue as
an athlete to access the protections of the MAA.91 The MAA became
effective January 1, 1997.92 In support of the MAA, California
Assembly Member Gary Miller compared “sports agents to drug
dealers who prey on kids.”93
The MAA’s restrictions on athlete agents are more stringent than
those placed on talent agents by the TAA.94 The MAA broadly
defines an “athlete agent” but fails to define what an athlete is. 95 In
addition, the MAA quickly sets forth that an “athlete agent” does not
include a talent agency. 96 The closest definition provided to clarify
what an athlete is, with respect to professional sports, states that it is
one who has “employment as a professional athlete,” including both
endorsement and professional services contracts.97 Further, the MAA
defines “endorsement contract” as an agreement where a person is
employed because of “publicity, reputation, fame, or following
obtained because of athletic ability or performance.”98

violated the Act, the Commissioner voided the parties’ contract ab initio and barred
Marathon from recovery.
Id. (footnote omitted).
91. Conditt, supra note 14.
92. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18895 (West 2017).
93. Baker, supra note 41, at 267.
94. Maryn Oyoung, Chapter 63: Renegotiating the Role of Athlete Agents, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV.
528, 529 (2012).
95. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18895.2(b)(1) (West 2017). The statute provides:
“Athlete agent” means any person who, directly or indirectly, recruits or solicits
an athlete to enter into any agent contract, endorsement contract, financial
services contract, or professional sports services contract, or for compensation
procures, offers, promises, attempts, or negotiates to obtain employment for any
person with a professional sports team or organization or as a professional athlete.
Id.; see also Baker, supra note 41, at 272; Smith, supra note 43.
96. BUS. & PROF. § 18895.2(b)(2)(C) (“‘Athlete agent’ also does not include a talent agency . . . .”).
97. BUS. & PROF. § 18895.2(c) (“‘Employment as a professional athlete’ includes employment
pursuant to an endorsement contract or a professional sports services contract.”); Oyoung, supra note
94.
98. BUS. & PROF. § 18895.2(d) (emphasis added) (“‘Endorsement contract’ means any contract or
agreement pursuant to which a person is employed or receives remuneration for any value or utility that
the person may have because of publicity, reputation, fame, or following obtained because of athletic
ability or performance.”).
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In Fighters Inc. v. Electronic Arts Inc., a dispute arose when
Electronic Arts (EA) used professional boxers’ images in a video
game after the group of boxers signed a group licensing agreement
with Fighters.99 EA argued that the agreement was invalid because
(1) Fighters did not comply with the requirements of the MAA, (2)
Fighters qualified as an “athlete agent” based on interactions with
professional boxers, and (3) the use of their images qualified as an
endorsement contract. 100 The court declined Fighters’ motion for
preliminary injunction, stating that “because Fighters is arguably
constrained by the requirements of the Miller Ayala Act, the
Agreement’s validity remains unclear at this stage.”101
The Fighters case provides a comparison for Tfue’s Gamer
Agreement with FaZe. A clear reading of the Agreement
demonstrates it is similar to both the licensing agreement at issue in
Fighters and an endorsement contract as defined in the MAA. Thus,
following the Court’s reasoning in Fighters, FaZe would similarly be
found in jeopardy of not complying with the MAA’s strict
requirements, and the Gamer Agreement could be declared void and
unenforceable.
Interestingly, soon after the passage of the MAA, the National
Collegiate Athletic Association and others from the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws drafted a
model law regulating athlete agents. 102 The model legislation became
99. No. CV 09-06389, 2009 WL 10699504, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2009).
100. Id. at *3.
101. Id. at *4.
102. Baker, supra note 41, at 271; Athlete Agents Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=cef8ae71-2f7b-4404-9af5309bb70e861e [https://perma.cc/2CYU-7VPK]. The Uniform Law Commission produced the following
statement with regard to the legislation adopted by many states besides California:
The Revised Uniform Athlete Agents Act (RUAAA) is an update of the Uniform
Athlete Agents Act of 2000, which has been enacted in 42 states. The 2000 Act
governs relations among student athletes, athlete agents, and educational institutions,
protecting the interests of student athletes and academic institutions by regulating the
activities of athlete agents. The Revised Act was promulgated in 2015 and makes
numerous changes to the original act, including expanding the definition of “athlete
agent” and “student athlete”; providing for reciprocal registration between states;
adding new requirements to the signing of an agency contract; and expanding
notification requirements. The RUAAA was amended in 2019 to allow student
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known as the Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA); currently
thirty-nine states have adopted the UAAA.103 California opted not to
formally adopt the UAAA, choosing instead what some have called a
“draconian system of regulating and penalizing” athlete agents.104
California’s choice, like that of the few other nonadoptive states, has
played an enabling hand in the confusing and conflicting definitions,
classifications, regulations, prohibited conduct, and possible penalties
between the various statutes governing athletes and their agents.105
C. Overall Gamer Agreement
FaZe and Tfue’s relationship soured just a year after entering into
the Gamer Agreement. The split gave rise to three lawsuits: (1)
Tfue’s action before the California Labor Commissioner arguing that
the Agreement was void under the TAA, (2) Tfue’s action in
California Superior Court arguing the Agreement was void ab initio
under the MAA, and (3) FaZe’s lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York asserting four causes of action for
breach of the Agreement and five related tort and quasi-contract
claims.106
athletes more freedom and flexibility when choosing between entering a professional
draft or continuing their collegiate education.
Athlete Agents Act, supra.
103. Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7801–7807; Chris Deubert, What’s a
“Clean” Agent to Do? The Case for a Cause of Action Against a Player’s Association, 18 JEFFREY S.
MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 1, 5 (2011).
104. Baker, supra note 41, at 299; Smith, supra note 43.
105. Deubert, supra note 103.
106. FaZe Clan Inc. v. Tenney, 467 F. Supp. 3d 180, 183–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). With regard to Tfue’s
first action, the Southern District of New York stated that the “merits of Tenney’s TAA claims are not
properly before this Court [because] California law designates the [California Labor Commission] as the
original tribunal for all TAA claims.” Id. at 186. One of FaZe’s causes of actions was for unjust
enrichment. Id. at 194. Tfue moved for conditional summary judgment in his favor arguing that a
declaration that the Gamer Agreement was void under the TAA would “also bar FaZe Clan from
recovering under a theory of unjust enrichment.” Id. (arguing that “the policy rationale of the TAA is so
strong that the statute forbids unlicensed talent agents from recovering from their clients either in
contract or in quasi-contract” (citing Yoo v. Robi, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 740 (Ct. App. 2005))). The court
disagreed and pointed to the narrow reading of this point in Marathon Entertainment where the Supreme
Court of California found that the TAA permits partial recovery for an unlicensed talent agency
operating in violation of the statute. Id. at 194 (citing Marathon Ent., Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 754
(Cal. 2008)). Thus, the court denied Tfue’s motion for summary judgment on this claim. Id.
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FaZe brought claims under New York law against Tfue for breach
of contract, intentional interference with contract, tortious
interference with prospective business advantage, and unjust
enrichment.107 Tfue counterclaimed and asserted defenses under the
TAA.108 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.109
Tfue’s chief complaint about his contract with FaZe was that the
“representatives of esports players . . . need to be regulated much like
the agents of film and TV stars.”110 The Gamer Agreement was
originally created April 27, 2018, and was to last for six months, with
an automatic extension for an additional thirty-six months provided
Tfue met certain conditions.111 FaZe could elect to extend the
contract at its sole discretion and could increase or decrease Tfue’s
salary by as much as 25%.112
Tfue accused FaZe of unlawfully acting as his agent and brought
to light whether gamers should be entitled to the same agent
protections as actors and artists in the traditional entertainment
industry.113 Tfue claimed FaZe collected up to 80% of the revenue
from third parties and prevented him from signing lucrative
sponsorships.114 Further, he claimed that the agreement was both
“grossly oppressive, onerous, and one-sided” and unjust because
Tfue was the artist performing the services and his celebrity status

107. Id. at 180.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Michael Hassall, Tfue Hits FaZe Clan with Lawsuit, UPCOMER (May 20, 2019),
https://old.upcomer.com/fortnite/story/1418257/tfue-faze-clan-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/ZZ8E-V8N7].
111. Tfue’s Contract, supra note 62. The Agreement states:
[I]nitial Term of this Agreement shall be six (6) months from the Effective Date
(“Term”). At the end of the Term, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary set
forth in this Agreement (including the T&Cs), . . . (this) Agreement shall be
automatically extended for an additional thirty-six (36) months, provided the
following conditions have been met[:] Play on the Team, which includes participating
in tournaments and training sessions with the Team and representing the Team,
including at events arranged by Company or where Company decides to participate,
and provide publicity and promotional services as required by Company.
Id.
112. McCann, supra note 36.
113. Zagger, supra note 33.
114. Conditt, supra note 14.
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was the primary draw to the profitable endorsements.115 Tfue’s
complaint stressed that Esports players “perform, act, direct and edit
their videos and then stream those videos” in a similar fashion to
artists and that FaZe has rejected some sponsorship deals due to a
glaring conflict of interest. 116 Tfue and his lawyers described the
Gamer Agreement and the terms within as unconscionable and in
violation of laws governing artists or athlete representation.117
FaZe swiftly denied the allegations and claimed it had only
received $60,000 from the Gamer Agreement and had not collected
any money from Tfue’s online tournament winnings.118 FaZe also
asserted that Tfue voluntarily and lawfully signed the Gamer
Agreement at a legal age—which will be a key argument in FaZe’s
defense.119 California courts, like most, are wary of calling contracts
unfair, and Tfue’s formal complaint exemplified this reality by
failing to include a cause of action that claimed the contract was
unconscionable.120
The Gamer Agreement required Tfue to strictly adhere to many
different terms such as playing in tournaments and training sessions,
using three days a month for “publicity and promotional services,”
wearing FaZe clothing and merchandise associated with sponsors,
participating in social media campaigns, and representing FaZe

115. Id.; McCann, supra note 36.
116. McCann, supra note 36. Consider the following description:
Tenney’s complaint asserts that he created and performed in a video for sponsor
Digital Storm, a manufacturer of gaming computers. The video garnered over
[nineteen] million views, but Tenney insists without accompanying financial gain to
him. Tenney charges that FaZe Clan has unlawfully retained payments that should
have been paid to Tenney. . . . This purported deal would have been with HyperX,
makers of headsets and headphones. Tenney claims that FaZe Clan “passed on the
sponsorship deal” because it “perceived that HyperX was a competitor of another
sponsor that did business with FaZe Clan.” Tenney argues that in passing on the deal,
“FaZe Clan knowingly acted against Tenney’s interest by preventing third-parties
from helping Tenney source sponsorship deals.”
Id. (quoting Complaint, supra note 36, at 12).
117. Zagger, supra note 33.
118. Conditt, supra note 14.
119. McCann, supra note 36.
120. Thooorin, supra note 38.
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exclusively within the industry. 121 In return, FaZe would pay Tfue
$2,000 per month as a fixed fee and claim 50% of Tfue’s creator
code income, 80% from brand deals brought to Tfue by FaZe, and
50% from brand deals brought to FaZe by Tfue (despite the fact that
Tfue himself brought in the deal).122
Even more restrictive, the exclusivity period following lawful
termination of the Gamer Agreement, if elected, allowed FaZe to
automatically exercise exclusive rights to Tfue’s services in a manner
similar to the past restricted free agency in the National Football
League.123 Further, if the parties did not strike a deal during the
exclusivity period and Tfue signed with another team, FaZe could
still match the offer. 124 Tfue could only sign with another team after
two full months without any type of restriction from FaZe. 125 Finally,

121. McCann, supra note 36.
122. Tfue’s Contract, supra note 62 (“In the gaming industry, ‘creator code income’ can be
astronomical. . . . [S]ources say Tfue’s income is pushing $10 million dollars per year.”). Also, the
“contract states that FaZe will pay Tfue ‘$2,000 per month’ as a fixed fee, plus ‘[a]ll other income
(including, but not limited to, salaries, earnings, fees, royalties, bonuses, share of profits, and gifts, etc.)
generated in connection with Gamer’s Services (whether individually or as part of the Team).’” Id.;
FaZe Clan Inc. v. Tenney, 467 F. Supp. 3d 180, 183–84 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). The Southern District of New
York considered whether the Gamer Agreement obligated Tfue to split this revenue with FaZe. FaZe
Clan, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 189 (finding the term “in-game merchandise” vague and the definition of
“‘in-game/sticker’ . . . totally unhelpful in discerning its meaning” and therefore looking to extraneous
evidence to determine the parties’ intent). The court concluded that Tfue introduced overwhelming
evidence that the parties, prior to litigation, did not intend the term “in-game merchandise” to
encompass Tfue’s sales through the Support-A-Creator Program. Id. Thus, this evidence raised a
genuine factual dispute as to whether the parties intended the Gamer Agreement to cover the revenue
stream, warranting denial of FaZe’s motion for summary judgment. Id. at 190.
123. See FaZe Clan, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 192. The Agreement provides:
[If] Gamer receives an offer from another “Fortnite” team to join such team upon
lawful termination of the Agreement by Gamer (“Offer”), Gamer shall be obligated to
provide the Offer to Company and the identity of the party providing the Offer, and
Company shall have the right to match such Offer during a period of fifteen (15)
business days following Company’s actual receipt of the Offer (the “Matching
Right”). If Company elects to exercise the Matching Right, Company shall inform
Gamer within said fifteen (15) business day period, and Company shall, automatically
have exclusive rights to Gamer’s services on the same terms as the Offer, as
supplemented by all of the terms and conditions of the Agreement.
Tfue’s Contract, supra note 62.
124. McCann, supra note 36.
125. Id.
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if FaZe fired Tfue for a material breach, Tfue would be forced to sit
idle for six months and not play video games professionally.126
The Southern District of New York denied FaZe’s motion for
summary judgment against Tfue’s counterclaims and defenses under
the MAA.127
Evident by the Gamer Agreement’s terms, the Esports
industry-norm contract needs to be shredded, and the relationship
between professional gamers and organizations needs to be
reevaluated.128 Esports is a growing industry and is in the midst of
creating structure, and Tfue’s lawsuit started to pave the way into
forcing Esports companies into regulatory schemes similar to ones
governing traditional artists and talent agencies.129 Ultimately, FaZe
and Tfue settled the lawsuit.
D. Gamer Agreement Compared to Traditional Sports and Modeling
Tfue’s lawsuit and his Gamer Agreement with FaZe highlight how
fascinating the sports law field is and the interesting changes
currently happening with the explosion of Esports.130 For top-tier
professional gamers, video games are more than just a hobby or
pastime—to some it is a source of livelihood. 131 Some may be
126. Tfue’s Contract, supra note 62 (“In the event of termination for a Gamer Material Breach,
Gamer shall be prohibited from playing video games publicly (on-line or in live tournaments) or
professionally for a period of six (6) months from the effective date of such termination.”).
127. FaZe Clan, 467 F. Supp. 3d at 187 (finding that the restrictions mentioned supra “fall within the
ambit of [the MAA]”).
128. Thooorin, supra note 38.
129. Tricia Gorman, Online Gamer Fights Allegedly Exploitive Esports Contract, 37 WESTLAW J.
COMPUT. & INTERNET 12, 12 (2019); Thooorin, supra note 38. Recently, Tfue and FaZe settled their
lawsuit. Julia Alexander, Tfue Settles Lawsuit Against FaZe Clan over ‘Oppressive’ Gaming Contract,
THE VERGE (Aug. 26, 2020, 5:08 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/26/21403052/tfue-faze-clanlawsuit-settled-streaming-events-competition-esports [https://perma.cc/ZJP2-ZVMK]. See generally
FaZe Clan Inc. v. Tenney, 19-CV-7200, 2020 WL 4597321 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2020).
130. Robert P. Garbarino, So You Want to Be a Sports Lawyer, or Is It a Player Agent, Player
Representative, Sports Agent, Contract Advisor, Family Advisor or Contract Representative?, 1
JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 11, 44 (1994).
131. Hannah Dwan, What Are Esports? A Beginner’s Guide, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 18, 2017, 1:15 PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/gaming/guides/esports-beginners-guide/ [https://perma.cc/8J6M-76X8]. On
other fronts, Derek Micheau’s varsity-level scholarship for the nation’s first varsity Esports team to play
League of Legends also suggests considering him as a traditional athlete. Rianne Coale, If You Don’t
Think Pro Gamers Are Athletes, Consider This, CHI. TRIB. (June 21, 2016, 2:59 PM),
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hesitant to place professional gamers in the same category as baseball
or football stars, but there are “many factors supporting such a
classification.”132 Esports tournaments are frequently held in
traditional sports venues and receive coverage from major sports
television networks.133 These major cable networks such as TBS and
ESPN broadcast matches of video games including StarCraft and
Counter-Strike: Global Offensive.134
Tfue’s position with regard to FaZe displays the major tension in
the sports industry today: young, naïve gamers potentially worth
millions must “wade through a pool of sports agents who, like
barracudas, swarm the athlete and use any means necessary to sap
just a little bit of that athlete’s economic lifeblood for their own
benefit.”135 However, these agents would be out of business in the
world of professional sports before the 1970s because of the “Soviet

https://www.chicagotribune.com/redeye/redeye-esports-athlete-chicago-video-games-20160616story.html [https://perma.cc/XSD5-LAES].
132. Coale, supra note 131 (“Our interest isn’t going away and will continue to grow as eSports
continues to grow . . . . We recognize the fact that there is an audience there. You’ll continue to see us
making progressive and incremental moves and our interest intensify in the future.” (quoting John
Lasker, ESPN Vice President of Programming and Acquisitions)); Maryanne Kline, The Thrill of a Visa,
the Agony of Denial: Visa Challenges for the Esports Athlete, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 22, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/thrill-visa-agony-denial-visa-challenges-esports-athlete
[https://perma.cc/4ZXX-8ZEV].
133. Jacob Wolf, League of Legends to Be Broadcast on ESPN+, ESPN: ESPORTS (May 24, 2018),
https://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/23597723/league-legends-broadcast-espn+
[https://perma.cc/6H6C-KH9G]; Kline, supra note 132 (“For example, the League of Legends
Championship has been held at Madison Square Garden and the Staples Center and has been broadcast
by ESPN.”).
134. Basim Usmani, Is It Time for eSports Gamers to Be Recognised As Athletes?, THE GUARDIAN
(June 8, 2016, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/08/esports-pro-videogamers-recognised-athletes [https://perma.cc/JJ53-2PU9]. Esports viewership is on the rise:
While there have been scant studies about the popularity of eSports versus traditional
televised sporting events among young people, there’s no reason to believe eSports
won’t grow in viewership. Super Smash Bros Melee came out in 2001, but the largest
Super Smash Bros Melee tournament ever is taking place this July at Evo 2016. Last
year, the Evo stream for Super Smash Bros Melee broke the 200,000 viewer mark,
setting a new record for concurrent viewers at a fighting game event.
Id.
135. Brian Charles Lea, Note, Sports Are Big Business, So Stop Playing Games: Why Federal
Regulation Should Require Every Sports Agent to Possess a J.D., 1 J. ENT. & SPORTS L. 20, 21 (2009).
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model” used by teams where “a player became . . . property . . . for as
long as the team desired.”136
The reserve clause cemented in the Tfue’s Gamer Agreement is
reminiscent of a similar clause in Curt Flood’s lawsuit against the
Major League Baseball.137 Flood argued that the reserve clause
essentially equated players to property and, in so arguing, set in
motion the process that “would lead to freedom of career choice and
bargaining power for professional athletes in all leagues,” but the
Supreme Court ruled against him. 138 Flood’s case paved the way for
Peter Seiz’s arbitration case, where Seiz relied on Flood’s same
arguments and successfully brought about free agency in baseball. 139
Almost half a century later, and in a context few would have
imagined at the time, Tfue’s reserve clause draws on those same
sentiments to illuminate how FaZe prevented deals on his behalf.140
Tfue also asserted that the restraints embedded in the Gamer
Agreement denied him the opportunity to seek his own deals and
fully profit from the use of his name, image, and likeness—an
argument similar to the one raised in Ed O’Bannon’s lawsuit against
the NCAA.141
In addition, the U.S. government has shown a willingness to
recognize gamers as athletes in the traditional sense. Esports
136. Id. at 23.
137. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 258 (1972). The reserve system is depicted as follows:
To non-athletes it might appear that petitioner was virtually enslaved by the owners
of major league baseball clubs who bartered among themselves for his services. But,
athletes know that it was not servitude that bound petitioner to the club owners; it was
the reserve system. The essence of that system is that a player is bound to the club
with which he first signs a contract for the rest of his playing days. He cannot escape
from the club except by retiring, and he cannot prevent the club from assigning his
contract to any other club.
Id. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted); see also McCann, supra note 36.
138. Lea, supra note 135, at 23 n.19 (“[Flood] helped usher in a new era that allowed the players to
exercise greater control of their careers and to share in the owners’ economic prosperity.” (quoting
BRAD SNYDER, A WELL-PAID SLAVE 349 (2006) (alteration in original))). Also, Flood, “the talented
centerfielder for the St. Louis Cardinals baseball team,” refused to be traded and chose to give up a
couple of years of playing rather than be traded against his will. Id. at 23; Flood, 407 U.S. at 266;
McCann, supra note 36.
139. McCann, supra note 36.
140. Id.
141. Id. See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 205).
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“athletes” are permitted to enter the United States on business visitor
and athlete visas due to the parallels drawn to traditional sports.142
The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
approved an athlete visa for an Esports competitor for the first time in
2013, which expanded the category for nontraditional athletes. 143 The
USCIS has total discretion to determine what types of activities and
competitors fall within the visa criteria because neither “sport” nor
“athlete” is clearly defined. 144 The USCIS has demonstrated a
“willingness to expand the meaning of ‘athlete’” beyond traditional
sports by weighing the components of fine-tune motor controls and
mental dexterity rather than the physical conditions in traditional
sports.145 In addition, over 117,000 signatures supported a petition
urging that the term “athlete” includes Esports competitors in
response to the denial of a Swedish competitor’s visa because Super
Smash Brothers Melee was not considered a legitimate sport by the
U.S. government.146 After the outcry, the USCIS changed its mind
and approved the visa.147

142. Kline, supra note 132. The article highlights the following:
P visa policy for athletes is somewhat fragmented and can be found in a number of
sources including statutes, regulations, and the Foreign Affairs Manual. . . . And
USCIS has demonstrated a willingness to expand the meaning of “athlete” beyond
traditional sports, allowing individuals whose competitions involve mental dexterity
(as opposed to physical) to be classified as athletes. The P-1A classification applies to
individuals coming to the United States temporarily to perform as athletes at an
internationally recognized level of performance, with provisions for both amateur and
professional athletes. Petitions for an internationally recognized athlete must include
documentation of at least two evidentiary criteria, and major esports athletes seem
well-positioned to satisfy these criteria. Examples include evidence of having
participated to a significant extent in international competition with a national team,
or a written statement from a member of the sports media detailing how an applicant
or team is internationally recognized.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
143. Id. (“The first competitive esports player to obtain a P-1 visa was Canadian Danny Shiptur, a
well-known competitor of the game League of Legends, a multiplayer battle arena game. He was
followed by Korean Kim Dong-hwan, known for his skilled play of StarCraft II, a science fiction
strategy game.” (footnotes omitted)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Unlike traditional sports, it remains unclear whether Esports
professionals are employees or independent contractors.148 Neither
legislation nor court decisions have given clear answers, and the
Esports industry lacks a formal union that other traditional sports
have to effectively advocate for players. 149 The difference between
the two is an important consideration in contracts for Esports
professionals because employee status can provide many benefits,
including collective bargaining rights.150 The major difference
between being an employee and an independent contractor is that
“[i]ndependent contractors are free from supervision, direction, and
control in the performance of their duties” and work for
themselves.151 The key question in analyzing the two is the suspected

148. Hunter A. Bayliss, Note, Not Just a Game: The Employment Status and Collective Bargaining
Rights of Professional ESports Players, 22 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 359, 362 (2016). Esports
has failed to unionize:
Currently, players have not attempted to form a collective bargaining unit and the
NLRB has not asserted jurisdiction over eSports. There is no guarantee that the LCS,
after learning of the potential for a collective bargaining action, will not stop
providing payment (in an attempt to eliminate the employee relationship) or dissolve
altogether. However, by embracing the employee status of professional employees,
the LCS can further legitimize itself as an actual sport. This, in turn, would likely
bring more potential players into League of Legends (increasing the game’s
profitability) while also bringing more viewers to LCS events.
Id. at 408 (footnote omitted).
149. Ariel Sodomsky, Note, Models of Confusion: Strutting the Line Between Agent and Manager,
Employee and Independent Contractor in the New York Modeling Industry, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 269, 273 (2014). Other industries have unions to protect their people:
In addition to legislation, another idea is to create a union for models like those that
exist in other areas of the entertainment industry, such as for actors and directors. By
having an organization looking out for the models’ best interests, it would be much
more difficult for agencies to take advantage of the models, and even if the agencies
tried to take advantage, it would be much more difficult for the agencies to get away
with it. A large issue within the industry is that models stay silent about indiscretions
committed against them. A union is one way to make models feel more comfortable
talking about these transgressions, as the models would know that they have an
organization standing behind them and protecting them.
Id. at 301 (footnote omitted).
150. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (granting employees the right to collectively bargain without restraint);
Bayliss, supra note 148. See generally Nicholas C. Daly, Amateur Hour Is Over: Time for College
Athletes to Clock In Under the FLSA, 37 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 471 (2021), for an excellent look into the
importance of employee status in relation to college athletes.
151. Sodomsky, supra note 149, at 287 (alteration in original).
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employer’s ability to control the supposed employee by looking at
the manner and means by which the work is performed.152
The language of the Gamer Agreement indicated that Tfue is an
independent contractor for FaZe, but California law may recognize
him as an employee. 153 In hopes that California law will recognize
him as an employee, Tfue views his relationship with FaZe as one
between a “client artist and a talent agency.”154 Tfue is not the only
one—many early contracts for Esports teams try to categorize the
players as independent contractors, which is likely a
misclassification. 155 FaZe attempted to blur the lines of its
relationship with Tfue by treating him like an employee while acting
as his agent, putting behavioral standards on him, placing financial
limitations on him, paying him a salary, and claiming exclusivity on
sponsorships; the whole tangled web of problems further justifies
voiding the Gamer Agreement.156 Despite the strong argument for
classifying Esports professionals as employees rather than
152. Bayliss, supra note 148, at 386–87 (“Though evidence of economic control is not per se proof of
the control necessary to show an employee-employer relationship, the economic realities of the parties
must not be overlooked. . . . Further, control over manner and means of performance is also a difficult
matter to determine.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Johnson v. VCG-IS, LLC, No. 30-2015-00802813,
2019 WL 1245311, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2019); Tony Marks, The California Supreme Court Deals a
Blow
to
Independent
Contractors,
FORBES
(May
29,
2018,
8:16
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tonymarks/2018/05/29/the-california-supreme-court-deals-a-blow-toindependent-contractors/?sh=752eaafa70a1 [https://perma.cc/7YHF-B57T]. The Supreme Court of
California adopted a new standard that presumes that workers qualify as employees instead of
contractors:
Under the newly adopted “ABC test,” a worker is an independent contractor to whom
a wage order does not apply only if the hiring entity establishes all of the following:
(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hirer in connection
with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of
such work and in fact; (B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual
course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) that the worker is customarily engaged
in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as
the work performed for the hiring entity.
Marks, supra.
153. McCann, supra note 36.
154. Id.
155. MICHAEL D. SCOTT, SCOTT ON MULTIMEDIA LAW § 24.13 (4th ed. 2020) (“Even under normal
employment analysis, a contract that requires an esports athlete to live in a house with his/her
teammates, practice full-time, and participate in competitions and travel to events at the whim of the
team owner would constitute an employment agreement regardless of what it is labeled.”).
156. Thooorin, supra note 38.
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independent contractors, the industry may have never expanded by
starting with employees because, in the early days, it would not have
been economically feasible to pay gamers an employee salary for one
niche video game in the context of the entire Esports industry.157
However, as a seasoned player, Tfue “is performing work within the
usual course of FaZe Clan’s business” to support a classification of
employee.158
III. PROPOSAL
Esports, once on the periphery of the gaming culture, has erupted
in popularity in recent years and does not seem to be slowing down
in the years to come. 159 Following the traditional sports’ playbook,
Esports events attract enormous audiences, comparable to top-tier
sporting events by catering to a “desirable, content hungry youth[ful]
demographic that advertisers find appealing.”160 Unfortunately,
157. Id.
158. McCann, supra note 36. But see FaZe Clan Inc. v. Tenney, 467 F. Supp. 3d 180, 188 (S.D.N.Y.
2020) (“Tenny was not FaZe Clan’s employee.”). The court based its classification of Tfue as an
independent contractor on the language of the Gamer Agreement itself. Id.
159. TROST ET AL., supra note 23 (“Major eSports events attract audiences that rival some of the
world’s great[est] sporting events.”); SCOTT, supra note 155 (“While many are still struggling with the
value of playing videogames, the industry is largely announcing that esports have ‘finally hit the
mainstream . . . .’”); Megan Lovell, Esports Revenues to Reach $1B—Huge Opportunities for IT
Vendors, Especially in Education, FUTURESOURCE CONSULTING (June 5, 2019),
https://www.futuresource-consulting.com/insights/esports-revenues-to-reach-1b-huge-opportunities-forit-vendors-especially-in-education/?locale=en [https://perma.cc/5RNH-QCJS] (“Major competitions such
as the Intel Extreme Masters already attract more than a hundred thousand spectators, and millions of fans
follow esports broadcasts on streaming channels like Twitch. . . . [O]verall esports industry revenues are set to
exceed $900 million this year, with an 18% 2019–2023 CAGR expected, driving revenues through the
billion-dollar mark in 2020 and onto $1.8 billion by 2023.”); Smith, supra note 4 (“Esports have a growing,
dedicated following . . . that is poised to surpass $1 billion this year, representing
27% . . . year-over-year growth in valuation and more than double its sub-$500 million valuation in
2016.”).
160. TROST ET AL., supra note 23; see also Steven T. Taylor, Young but Experienced: Attorney Brings
Skills & Esports Knowledge to LA Firm, 36 OF COUNS.: LEGAL PRAC. & MGMT REP. 19, 22 (2017)
(“It’s very interesting and fun for me to help individuals who are so passionate about the new frontier in
sports and are not only redefining how to define athletes but redefining sports, how sports are consumed,
how consumers interact with sports figures.” (emphasis added) (quoting Esports attorney Aaron
Swerdlow)). In addition, Esports is already a $1 billion industry and soon will be a multibillion-dollar-ayear industry. Taylor, supra, at 20; TROST ET AL., supra note 23 (“[Esports is a] rapidly growing form of
entertainment, driven in part by the growing provenance of online gaming and online broadcasting
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Esports remains widely fragmented in terms of industry-norm
contracts, the utter lack of regulation of the industry, and most
importantly, the ambiguous statutory scheme that fogs the
classification of professional gamers as athletes, artists, or something
anew.161 Therefore, California’s legislature or the U.S. Congress
remain responsible for preventing the ethereal foundations of the
Esports industry from collapsing and dissolving a new citadel of
sport—professional gaming.162 By dismantling the pros from the
cons of the TAA and MAA, legislatures can craft new
Esports-specific legislation to account for this sui generis industry
and allow it to function to its fullest potential.
Half a century later, the Labor Commissioner repeatedly uses
outdated reasoning from the first cases interpreting the TAA despite
the evolving entertainment industry giving rise to new and exciting
creative minds. The TAA and MAA give no clear answers as to
whether professional gamers are professional athletes, artists, or
something anew. In addition, neither legislation, executive orders,
nor court decisions have paved a path to sound reasoning, which
could cause this confusion to persist for decades. An influencer- or
gamer-specific legislation could give definitive classification to these
new, evolving roles in society. 163 By looking at the dismantled pros
of the TAA and the MAA, legislatures can effectively craft a law that
makes sense for professional gamers, encompassed by the role of
influencers in all industries.
technologies. . . . [C]ommercial opportunity . . . has led to a significant influx of investment
capital . . . .”).
161. Stark & Walkowiak, supra note 22 (“Perhaps no game—or more accurately collection of
games—is harder to regulate than esports.”); Thooorin, supra note 38.
162. Stark & Walkowiak, supra note 22.
163. Sodomsky, supra note 149, at 297–98. An example of specific legislation:
[T]he best solution may be to create model-specific legislation to govern the diverse
and complex relationships within the modeling industry. . . . By having an
organization looking out for the models’ best interests, it would be much more
difficult for agencies to take advantage of the models, and even if the agencies tried
to take advantage, it would be much more difficult for the agencies to get away with
it. . . . While working to build numbers, the Model Alliance could also try to get more
big name models to join them.
Id. at 297–302.
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Four decades ago, California’s legislature designed rules tailored
to protect Hollywood talent from atrocious impulses in the
entertainment and media industry. 164 This harsh industry, where a
single misstep can be punished, implores creative talent and their
representatives to venture through a jungle of various employment
and service opportunities. 165 The TAA has been on the books since
1978—with its roots entrenched in earlier Hollywood days—and is
now at the front and center of heightened controversy between artists
and agents.166 Although formulated in good faith to protect artists
from capitalizing agents, the TAA’s current state benefits artists who
use the Act as a tool to repudiate now undesirable contracts. 167
Legislatures and courts have grappled with the TAA’s harshness,
and the legislature amended the TAA in 1982 with sunset
provisions.168 Courts have also bowed down to the exclusive
authority of the Labor Commissioner in analyzing these contracts and
have avoided overruling any of the Commissioner’s decisions.169
164. David Ng, The Latest Wrinkle in the Writer-Agent War: A State Law Widely Seen As Outdated,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/hollywood/la-fi-ct-talentagencies-act-20190430-story.html [https://perma.cc/2TBF-G76X] (“Although the statute was initially
intended to protect the weak, some experts say it now gives agents a captive client base, enthroning
them in positions of impregnable power.”).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Keith Warren & Ryan Wechsler, “An Offer California Can’t Refuse”: How an Efficient and
Adaptable Framework Can Improve Remedies Under the Talent Agency Act and Correct the Issues with
Its Interpretation, 21 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 79, 93 (2014).
168. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.44(c)–(d) (West 2013); Marathon Ent., Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 753
(Cal. 2008); Warren & Wechsler, supra note 167, at 89 (“[T]he Legislature amended the TAA in 1982
by imposing a one-year statute of limitations, eliminating criminal sanctions for violations, and
establishing a ‘safe harbor’ for managers to procure employment when acting in conjunction with a
licensed agent.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting LAB. § 1700.44(d))).
169. LAB. § 1700.44; Warren & Wechsler, supra note 167, at 94. The Labor Commissioner has
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes that arise under the TAA. Id. The Labor Commissioner’s
jurisdiction is limited by section 1700.45, which allows the parties to arbitrate the contract in limited
circumstances. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.45 (West 2013); see also Marathon Ent., 174 P.3d at 753. The
Supreme Court of California summarized:
We recognize, however, that in more recent decisions, the Labor Commissioner has
expressly adopted the position Blasi advocates: severance is never available to permit
partial recovery of commissions for managerial services that required no talent
agency license. . . . [T]he Labor Commissioner’s assessment of the legislative history
and case law is mistaken . . . . We are thus unpersuaded and decline to follow the
Labor Commissioner’s interpretation.
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Thus, the Labor Commissioner maintains impregnable power to strip
away earnings from agents. 170 Contrary to the TAA’s original
purpose, artists fail to “employ the TAA as a shield” to ensure the
protections originally contemplated by the legislature and instead use
the TAA as a sword to strike down contracts—hopelessly leaving
agents to the mercy of artist-wielded swords.171
This proposed legislation should change and adapt the statutory
text in the TAA’s definition of “artist” to account for professional
gamers and ultimately influencers by more appropriately defining
“other entertainment enterprises.”172 This would avoid the problems
the TAA is currently struggling with by revising outdated language.
In light of the fierce war between artist and agent, scholars on both
sides believe “the application . . . feels outdated.”173 Surely, the
drafters of the TAA meant well in providing the catch-all provision
in defining “artist”; but did they anticipate the booming industry of
Esports in light of almost half-century-old technology?174 Decisions
throughout the past half century appear bent on maintaining the
TAA’s purpose when analyzing differing creative talent as artists or
not.175 Historically, California’s Labor Commission has held that a
Marathon Ent., 174 P.3d at 754 (citations omitted).
170. Warren & Wechsler, supra note 167, at 96.
171. Id. at 93–94, 96.
172. See supra Section II.A.
173. Ng, supra note 164 (“The laws were put in place to protect talent from being abused and taken
advantage of . . . . It’s the application that feels outdated.” (emphasis added) (quoting New York
entertainment attorney Jason Boyarski).
174. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1700.4 (West 2013). The statute provides:
“Artists” means actors and actresses rendering services on the legitimate stage and in
the production of motion pictures, radio artists, musical artists, musical organizations,
directors of legitimate stage, motion picture and radio productions, musical directors,
writers, cinematographers, composers, lyricists, arrangers, models, and other artists
and persons rendering professional services in motion picture, theatrical, radio,
television and other entertainment enterprises.
Id. (emphasis added).
175. Determination of Controversy at 6, Bluestein v. Prod. Arts Mgmt., TAC 24–98 (Cal. Lab.
Comm’n Nov. 3, 1999). The Commission stated:
Occasionally assisting in shot location or stepping in as a second director as described
by petitioner, does not rise to the creative level required of an “artist” as intended by
the drafters. Virtually all line producers or production managers engage in de minimis
levels of creativity. There must be more than incidental creative input. The individual
must be primarily engaged in or make a significant showing of a creative contribution
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person is an “artist” when the professional services are creative in
nature; despite this open-ended formula, the Labor Commissioner
limits this inquiry when the services are in connection with an
entertainment enterprise.176 In American First Run v. OMNI
Entertainment Group, the Labor Commissioner did not believe the
legislature intended for such a “radically far-reaching result” and thus
imposed this limitation.177 Therefore, conflicting views enshroud the
TAA’s definition of “artist” in a heavy veil of fog most likely not
applicable to professional gamers.
Further, license requirements should be removed to eliminate the
ambiguity in procuring employment for professional gamers by a
manager, agent, or someone on similar footing—this distinguishes
the chilling effect on lawyers who do not have an agency license.
Many agents feel the TAA is overly vague in different statutory
sections in defining various moving parts and players in the
entertainment industry. 178 Specifically, the TAA’s definition of
“procurement” remains unclear and leaves agents, at best, to guess
what activities are determined to be procurement. 179
This ambiguity has long haunted entertainers’ agents, especially
with the possible hard-hitting penalties for violating the TAA, with
to the production to be afforded the protection of the Act. We do not feel budget
management falls within these parameters.
Id.; see also Warren & Wechsler, supra note 167, at 107.
176. Determination of Controversy at 4, Patchett v. DLM LA, Inc., TAC 47367 (Cal. Lab. Comm’n
Oct. 18, 2018).
177. Order Dismissing Petition to Determine Controversy at 5, Am. First Run v. OMNI Ent. Grp.,
TAC 32–95 (Cal. Lab. Comm’n Apr. 8, 1996) (cleaned up); Determination of Controversy, supra note
176, at 4 (“Without such a limitation, virtually every ‘person rendering professional services’ connected
with an entertainment project . . . would fall within the definition of ‘artists.’”).
178. Richard Busch, Walking on the California Talent Agency Act’s Thin Ice: Personal Managers
Beware!,
FORBES
(Mar.
25,
2013,
11:19
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardbusch/2013/03/25/walking-on-the-california-talent-agency-actsthin-ice-personal-managers-beware/#101dc3f7609f [https://perma.cc/9K7D-6UMP].
179. Marathon Ent., Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 750 (Cal. 2008). The Supreme Court of California
has noted:
We note we are not called on to decide, and do not decide, what precisely constitutes
“procurement” . . . . The Act contains no definition, and the Labor Commissioner has
struggled over time to better delineate which actions involve mere general assistance
to an artist’s career and which stray across the line to illicit procurement.
Id.
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even a minor infraction resulting in losses of past and future earnings
and cancellation of the contract. 180 The confusion may result in a
chilling effect on the work of agents, deterring them from doing
customary work for their artists due to the fear of severe
consequences.181 Scholars estimate that the California Labor
Commission has canceled over $250 million in personal management
commissions for such violations, and the Waisbren court seems to
support this finding: “the most effective weapon for assuring
compliance with the Act is the power . . . to . . . declare any contract
entered into between the parties void from the inception.”182
Removing the license requirement in the new statute would help
everyone involved in the industry by removing the possibilities of
severe sanctions and fines.
Unlike the trend of the Labor Commissioner and previous
decisions, the burden of production should also be shifted to the
professional gamer or influencer who challenges the contract. In past
decisions, the burden of proof seemed to be placed on the agent, with
the artist contesting the contract receiving a favorable attitude from
the Labor Commissioner. “Under federal evidence law and the
common law of contracts, the party attempting to void a contract
generally bears the burden of showing the court that the contract
should indeed be voided.”183 Further, every affirmative defense to a
contract’s enforceability places the burden on the challenging
party.184 In addition, when viewing the contract, the Labor
180. See, e.g., Chiba v. Greenwald, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 86, 90, 92 (Ct. App. 2007); Yoo v. Robi, 24 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 740, 751 (Ct. App. 2005); Park v. Deftones, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1465, 1465 (1999); Waisbren v.
Peppercorn Prods., Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437, 438–40 (Ct. App. 1995); Busch, supra note 178.
181. See generally Busch, supra note 178.
182. Waisbren, 48 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446–47 (quoting CAL. ENT. COMM’N, REPORT TO LEGISLATURE
AND GOVERNOR ON THE TALENT AGENCIES ACT 17 (1985)); see also Busch, supra note 178.
183. Warren & Wechsler, supra note 167, at 107.
184. Id. at 107 n.187. Examples of affirmative defenses include:
For example, the party asserting the affirmative defense of impossibility bears the
burden of proving a real impossibility and not a mere inconvenience or unexpected
difficulty. . . . Further, the burden of proof for the affirmative defense of
unconscionability is on the party claiming the contract is unconscionable. . . . In terms
of the affirmative defense of fraud, courts have held a fundamental essential to a valid
defense of fraud is that the defendant must show that it relied on the alleged
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Commissioner should determine the main purpose of the contract. If
the main purpose of the contract is not to engage in illegal
procurement, the Labor Commissioner should, in light of the
Marathon decision, use the doctrine of severability to prevent unjust
enrichment.185 These new requirements for the piece of legislation
would greatly alleviate the strain between agents and professional
gamers, and “contracts under this suggestion would be less likely to
be voided in their entirety.”186
On the MAA front, the harsh criminal penalties should be
eliminated in the new legislation to avoid deterring agents from
procuring deals for professional gamers. The new legislation should
also account for a definition of “athlete” that the MAA so heedlessly
ignored. This would rectify the disastrous problems the MAA created
initially when it replaced prior law and repealed several sections of
California’s Labor Code.187 Under prior law, the Labor
Commissioner played an important role similar to the one it played
under the TAA; the provision required athlete agents to register with
the Labor Commissioner.188 Unlike the TAA, the MAA imposes an
enhanced and harsh system of not only civil liability but also criminal
liability for slight violations of the statute. 189 Further, these harsh
misrepresentation. . . . The burden was on the defendant to prove that
element. . . . Duress and undue influence are affirmative defenses which may
invalidate a contract, and the defendant bears the burden of proof to establish them.
Id. (citations omitted).
185. Marathon Ent., Inc. v. Blasi, 174 P.3d 741, 754 (Cal. 2008) (“In deciding whether severance is
available, we have explained ‘[t]he overarching inquiry is whether “the interests of justice . . . would be
furthered” by severance.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare
Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 696 (Cal. 2000))). The court went further in explaining the interests of justice:
Courts are to look to the various purposes of the contract. If the central purpose of the
contract is tainted with illegality, then the contract as a whole cannot be enforced. If
the illegality is collateral to the main purpose of the contract, and the illegal provision
can be extirpated from the contract by means of severance or restriction, then such
severance and restriction are appropriate.
Id. (quoting Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 696).
186. Warren & Wechsler, supra note 167, at 110.
187. Baker, supra note 41.
188. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1510 (repealed 1996).
189. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18897.8 (West 2017). The statute provides:
Any professional athlete, or any student athlete, or any elementary or secondary
school, college, university, or other educational institution, or any league, conference,
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penalties include a minimum $50,000 civil penalty or misdemeanor
carrying up to a year in county jail. 190 Additionally, the prevailing
party may recover punitive damages, court costs, and reasonable
attorneys’ fees.191 Despite these harsh penalties, there is no doubt in
passing the MAA that the California legislature acted in good faith to
protect athletes, and new legislation should follow in its good-faith
footsteps when eliminating these harsh criminal penalties. 192
This amendment or new legislation should also relinquish its death
grip on the practice of law for attorneys in California. The benefit of
this piece of legislation would be to encourage attorneys to become
influencer agents without worrying about grueling statutory
requirements like licenses. In doing so, the new legislation would
avoid problems seen in the MAA. Incidental to any good-faith effort
shown by the legislature, the MAA brought under its ambit rules
governing the practice of law in California. 193 The MAA required
any licensed agent to post either an insurance policy or $100,000 in
collateral that cuts in favor of securing judgments by athletes versus
agents.194 Why should attorneys post any collateral to practice law?
The entry fee of $100,000 of liquid net worth is unnecessary and was

association, or federation of the preceding educational institutions, or any other
person may bring a civil action for recovery of damages from an athlete agent, if that
professional athlete, that student athlete, that institution, any member of that league,
conference, association, or federation, or that other person is adversely affected by the
acts of the athlete agent or of the athlete agent’s representative or employee in
violation of this chapter.
Id.; CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18897.93(a) (West 2017). The statute also provides:
An athlete agent or athlete agent’s representative or employee who violates any
provision of this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine
of not more than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), or imprisonment in a county jail
not exceeding one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment.
BUS. & PROF. § 18897.93(a); Baker, supra note 41.
190. BUS. & PROF. § 18897.93(a).
191. BUS. & PROF. § 18897.8(b) (“A plaintiff that prevails in a civil action brought under this section
may recover actual damages, or fifty thousand dollars ($50,000), whichever is higher; punitive damages;
court costs; and reasonable attorney’s fees.”).
192. Baker, supra note 41, at 278.
193. Id.
194. BUS. & PROF. § 18897.87(a) (“A policy or policies of insurance against liability imposed on or
against the agent by law for damages arising out of claims in an amount for each claim of at least one
hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).”); Baker, supra note 41.
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put in place by a special interest that has resulted in a chilling effect,
discouraging attorneys from becoming athlete agents and entrusting
the field to “less scrupulous, unlicensed persons.”195
In addition, the new legislation needs to provide a thorough
definition of “athlete” to help guide courts in determining if an
influencer is an athlete, artist, or a combination thereof. This would
benefit both sides of influencer contracts and eliminate ambiguity in
determining what type of conflicting law applies by establishing a
benchmark definition to refer to when analyzing influencer contracts.
This would also avoid ambiguities evident in the MAA. Most
troublesome, the MAA fails to define what an “athlete” is.196 Further,
California failed to adopt the UAAA and relies on a “draconian
system of regulating and penalizing” athlete agents.197 California and
the MAA have sanctioned the complicated and unsettled area of
defining, classifying, regulating, and penalizing athletes, their agents,
and the relationship between the athletes and their agents.198
Overall, after redefining “artist” and finally defining “athlete,” the
legislation should account for a combination of characteristics and
traits that allude to both an artist and an athlete to account for
professional gamers’ unique, creative content making, and to allow
for a flexible framework for future creative content makers.
CONCLUSION
The Esports industry is experiencing rapid growth, and it is
certainly an exciting and pivotal time to be involved in the Esports
market.199 California law is ill-fitted to the Esports industry and gives
195. Baker, supra note 41, at 279.
196. See supra Section I.B.
197. Baker, supra note 41, at 299; Smith, supra note 43.
198. Deubert, supra note 103, at 4.
199. Kyle Kenny, How Visa Issues Combined with Recent Franchising Agreements Effect Current
Esports Players and the Future Landscape of Esports, PENN. ST. U. J.L. & INT’L AFFS.: BLOG (Oct. 30,
2018), https://sites.psu.edu/jlia/1256-2/ [https://perma.cc/7338-2CFW] (“At its current growth rate, the
esports industry is poised to rival, if not surpass traditional sports in viewership and player rate.”); Jay
Massaad, Report: Esports to Be Worth Almost $2b by 2022, ESPORTS I NSIDER (Oct. 18, 2017),
http://www.esportsinsider.com/2017/10/report-esports-worth-almost-2b-2022/ [https://perma.cc/Y7MC-
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no clear answers in classifying professional gamers as athletes,
artists, or something else. Video games and the Esports industry have
been misunderstood for a long period of time, and now those
unfamiliar with the industry are uncertain of how old laws govern the
skyrocketing industry. Is Esports a sport, or is it some sort of
entertainment activity, like going to the movies?
It is up to California’s legislature or the U.S. Congress to enact
new, unique legislation to put an end to this debate. By enacting new
influencer- or gamer-specific legislation, professional gamers and
agents can better understand their relationship and enjoy the
protections afforded to other creative minds in the entertainment
industry. The combination of factors from the TAA and the MAA
asserted in this Note provides a worthy framework in drafting new
legislation without frustrating the overall purpose of the two acts.
Overall, California’s legislature must assert its authority and voice to
implement new legislation for a unique, complex industry to allow it
to function to its fullest potential. After all, Esports participants are
far from the “perpetuated stereotype of video games being played by
overweight teenagers huddled in dark basements”—they account for
the global revenue of Esports’ predicted value of $1.1 billion in 2020,
up 26% from 2018.200 It is time they start being treated as a valuable
part of the American workforce.

WNC2].
200. See Holden et al., supra note 7.

Published by Reading Room, 2021

43

